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NOTES
MILKOVICH, #METOO, AND “LIARS”:
DEFAMATION LAW AND THE FACT-OPINION
DISTINCTION
Pooja Bhaskar*
Since the start of the #MeToo movement, sexual assault survivors have
increasingly turned defamation law against their alleged assaulters. In these
#MeToo defamation cases, an alleged victim publicly claims that another
person, usually someone of considerable wealth and fame, sexually assaulted
them. The alleged assaulter then calls their accuser a liar, causing their
accuser to sue their alleged assaulter for defamation. These cases have
consistently raised an element of the defamation analysis that has long
challenged courts: distinguishing between statements of actionable “fact”
and nonactionable “opinion.”
#MeToo defamation cases raise the question of whether an alleged
assaulter’s claim that their accuser lied constitutes actionable fact or
nonactionable opinion. The U.S. Supreme Court attempted to provide
guidance on how to conduct fact-opinion analyses in a case similar to
#MeToo cases, where a plaintiff sued the defendant for calling them a liar.
However, U.S. courts diverge in their approaches to the fact-opinion analysis
and have come to varying results on the fact-opinion question in #MeToo
defamation cases.
This Note argues that, when properly applied, the fact-opinion distinction
does not shield alleged assailants from defamation liability because the
alleged assailants’ claims that their alleged victims lied constitute implicit
assertions of eyewitness testimony about a factual matter.
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INTRODUCTION
The emotional cost alone of bringing up such memories publicly . . . is pure
bankruptcy. . . . It is the deep end of a pool where I cannot swim. It is a
famous man telling you that you are a liar for what you have remembered.
—Amber Tamblyn1

Over the course of a year, the #MeToo movement2 led to sexual
misconduct allegations against at least 425 prominent figures across various
industries in the United States.3 Notable examples of alleged4 sexual

1. Amber Tamblyn, Opinion, Amber Tamblyn: I’m Done with Not Being Believed, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/16/opinion/sunday/ambertamblyn-james-woods.html [https://perma.cc/R5BS-JCZJ] (speaking about actor James
Woods’s attempt to pick the author up when she was underage).
2. Tarana Burke originally created the “Me Too” campaign in 2007. Sandra E. Garcia,
The Woman Who Created #MeToo Long Before Hashtags, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/us/me-too-movement-tarana-burke.html
[https://perma.cc/8L6K-6VKK]. Subsequently, “Me Too” was popularized as a hashtag
following Alyssa Milano’s October 2017 tweet, which Milano published as a response to thenrecent sexual assault allegations against Harvey Weinstein. Alyssa Milano
(@Alyssa_Milano), TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2017, 4:21 PM), https://twitter.com/Alyssa_Milano/
status/919659438700670976 [https://perma.cc/623A-C5YU]. The #MeToo movement gives
a voice to sexual harassment victims, and “give[s] people a sense of the magnitude of the
problem.” Id.
3. Riley Griffin et al., #MeToo: One Year Later, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 5, 2018), https://
www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-me-too-anniversary/ [https://perma.cc/Q9WZ-HWS5].
4. Bill Cosby is the only #MeToo figure to have been convicted of sexual assault as of
September 26, 2019. See Morning Edition: Bill Cosby and the #MeToo Movement, NPR
(Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/26/651710715/bill-cosby-and-the-metoomovement [https://perma.cc/5J4V-GPBZ]. As of October 6, 2019, Cosby is appealing this
conviction. See Jon Hurdle, Bill Cosby’s Appeal Begins with Sharp Questioning by Judges,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/12/arts/television/bill-cosbynew-trial-appeal.html [https://perma.cc/8YWK-64YH].
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assaulters include Donald Trump,5 Harvey Weinstein,6 Jeffrey Epstein,7 and
Brett Kavanaugh.8 Responses from the accused figures have largely
consisted of denials.9 Several sexual assault accusations, followed by alleged
assailants’ denials,10 have led to defamation suits.11
The defamation suits involving Bill Cosby illustrate the nature of these
claims. After several women publicly claimed that Bill Cosby sexually
assaulted them, Cosby’s attorney made statements to the media on Cosby’s
behalf12 that not only denied these claims but either implied that the women
were liars13 or explicitly called the women liars.14 In response, a number of
these women sued Cosby for defamation, in each case alleging that, in calling
her a “liar” through his attorney, he damaged her reputation.15 Cosby replied

5. See Zervos v. Trump, 74 N.Y.S.3d 442 (Sup. Ct. 2018), aff’d, 94 N.Y.S.3d 75 (App.
Div. 2019).
6. See Bill Chappell, Judge Dismisses Ashley Judd’s Sexual Harassment Claim Against
Harvey Weinstein, NPR (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/01/10/683993516/judgedismisses-ashley-judds-sexual-harassment-claim-against-harvey-weinstein [https://perma.cc/
GQP9-EKWT] (stating that Judd’s defamation claim could move forward).
7. See Ali Watkins & Vivian Wang, Jeffrey Epstein Is Accused of Luring Girls to His
Manhattan Mansion and Abusing Them, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/07/nyregion/jeffrey-epstein-sex-trafficking.html
[https://perma.cc/2A2J-EYK5].
8. See Full Transcript: Christine Blasey Ford’s Opening Statement to the Senate
Judiciary Committee, POLITICO (Sept. 26, 2018, 6:22 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/
2018/09/26/christine-blasey-ford-opening-statement-senate-845080 [https://perma.cc/K4KJZAHM].
9. See Sarah Almukhtar et al., After Weinstein: 71 Men Accused of Sexual Misconduct
and Their Fall from Power, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2017/11/10/us/men-accused-sexual-misconduct-weinstein.html
[https://perma.cc/8XWWVUBK]; Post-Weinstein, These Are the Powerful Men Facing Sexual Harassment Allegations,
GLAMOUR (May 18, 2019), https://www.glamour.com/gallery/post-weinstein-these-are-thepowerful-men-facing-sexual-harassment-allegations [https://perma.cc/JU39-ZWFH].
10. This Note uses legalistic terms to refer to the legal stage of accusations and the
technical positions of the parties involved. Women who have publicly accused someone of
assaulting them and are plaintiffs in #MeToo defamation suits are referred to as “accusers” or
a variation thereof. Likewise, those accused of sexual assault, the defendants in these
defamation suits, are referred to as “the accused,” or another such variation. The purpose of
this terminological choice is to avoid confusion as to whether the sexual assault crime
underlying the defamation claim was tried in court. In the #MeToo defamation suits discussed
in this Note, the sexual assaults underlying the defamation claims were not pursued in a
criminal law capacity, and the alleged victims also did not pursue civil claims against their
alleged assaulters.
11. Daniel Jackson, Sex-Assault Accusers Turn to Defamation Lawsuits in #MeToo Era,
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.courthousenews.com/sex-assaultaccusers-turn-to-defamation-lawsuits-in-metoo-era/ [https://perma.cc/VCY5-S7GJ].
12. See infra notes 76–78.
13. See Hill v. Cosby, 665 F. App’x 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2016); Green v. Cosby, 138 F. Supp.
3d 114, 121–23 (D. Mass. 2015).
14. See Dickinson v. Cosby, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 430, 439 (Ct. App. 2017) (presenting the
content of Singer’s denial, wherein he describes Janice Dickinson’s rape allegation as “an
outrageous defamatory lie”); see also Jackson, supra note 11.
15. See Hill, 665 F. App’x at 173; Green, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 121; Dickinson, 225 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 441.
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that, because it was merely his opinion that the respective women were liars,
he was protected from defamation liability.16
When a defamation defendant claims the allegedly defamatory statement
constitutes nonactionable opinion, the court engages in a fact-opinion
analysis to determine whether the defamation claim can move forward.17
Thus, a key inquiry in #MeToo defamation cases is whether a claim that a
sexual assault accuser is a “liar” constitutes nonactionable opinion or
actionable fact.18
Courts have come to differing conclusions on whether the defendants in
these defamation suits may avoid liability through an opinion defense,19 in
part because courts across the country utilize different fact-opinion
analyses.20 This variation exists despite the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court
has provided a fact-opinion framework in this very context. In Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co.,21 the defendant called the plaintiff a liar in a newspaper
column relating to a controversial high school sporting event.22 The Court
clarified how the fact-opinion analysis should be conducted and found that
the “liar” allegation was actionable.23 However, lower courts have
subsequently used different analyses and arrived at different conclusions on
whether a “liar” allegation is actionable.24
A pair of Bill Cosby #MeToo defamation cases involving the exact same
“liar” statement demonstrate the issue. In this statement, Cosby’s attorney
characterized the sexual assault allegations as “unsubstantiated, fantastical
stories . . . [that] have escalated far past the point of absurdity” and that “it is
completely illogical” that anyone would wait decades to give any indication

16. See, e.g., Hill, 665 F. App’x at 171–72; Green, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 121–22; Dickinson,
225 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 439–40.
17. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 13–15 (1990) (describing the
transition from the common law’s lack of distinction between statements of fact and opinion
to U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence forming such a distinction); see also infra Part II
(describing #MeToo and #MeToo-related cases in which courts analyzed the fact-opinion
question after the defamation defendants argued that they were shielded from liability because
their allegedly defamatory statements were opinions).
18. See infra Part I.C (demonstrating that the “fact-opinion” distinction is more complex
than distinguishing between facts and opinions to determine whether a statement is actionable
for defamation). However, scholarship and court opinions continue to use the “fact-opinion”
phraseology in reference to current methods of defamation analysis, and so this Note will
likewise do the same.
19. Compare Hill, 665 F. App’x 169 (finding that the alleged assaulter prevailed on the
fact-opinion question), and Dickinson, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 430 (finding that the alleged assaulter
prevailed on the fact-opinion question), with Green, 138 F. Supp. 3d 114 (finding that the
accuser prevailed on the fact-opinion question), and Zervos v. Trump, 74 N.Y.S.3d 442 (Sup.
Ct. 2018), aff’d, 94 N.Y.S.3d 75 (App. Div. 2019) (finding that the accuser prevailed on the
fact-opinion question).
20. See infra Part II (illustrating the variety of fact-opinion analyses utilized by courts,
even when different courts use the same type of analysis).
21. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
22. Id. at 3.
23. See infra Part I.C.2 (explaining the Court’s holding).
24. See infra Part II.B.
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that they had been assaulted.25 In Hill v. Cosby,26 the Third Circuit ruled
that this statement constituted nonactionable opinion.27 But in Green v.
Cosby,28 the District of Massachusetts held that this statement was actionable
fact.29
The #MeToo movement continues to raise important discussions about the
prevalence of sexual harassment in the workplace, power dynamics, and the
cultural and systemic responses to these issues.30 Events like Brett
Kavanaugh’s confirmation hearing31 and the emergence of #MeToo abroad32
demonstrate that the movement is gathering momentum. Participants in the
#MeToo movement will likely continue to use defamation as a legal tool,33
making it important to clarify the fact-opinion analysis so that litigants can
rely on more predictable results.
This Note addresses how the fact-opinion distinction should be applied to
#MeToo “liar” cases. It argues that a proper application of Milkovich leads
to a core feature of #MeToo defamation cases that courts have not adequately
considered—the defendant’s role as a first-person witness in the alleged
sexual assault underlying the defamation claim. Part I provides an overview
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Hill, 665 F. App’x at 172; Green, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 122.
665 F. App’x 169 (3d Cir. 2016).
Id. at 175–77.
138 F. Supp. 3d 114 (D. Mass. 2015).
Id. at 132, 134.
See generally Kim Elsesser, The Latest Consequence of #MeToo: Not Hiring Women,
FORBES (Sept. 5, 2019, 3:30 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kimelsesser/2019/09/05/thelatest-consequence-of-metoo-not-hiring-women/ [https://perma.cc/CYH8-85M6]; Gene
Marks, When Men Are Afraid to Interact with Women at Work, It Harms the Whole Company,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 5, 2019, 6:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/sep/05/
when-men-are-afraid-to-interact-with-women-at-work-it-harms-the-whole-company
[https://perma.cc/47G9-VW7U].
31. See Clare Foran, After Outpouring of Personal Stories, Congress Still Grappling with
Kavanaugh Confirmation Fallout, CNN (Oct. 20, 2018, 8:08 AM), https://www.cnn.com/
2018/10/20/politics/metoo-congress-women-harassment-assault/index.html
[https://perma.cc/RRM3-HJC9].
32. A notable example is #MeToo’s arrival in India. See Manveena Suri, India’s #MeToo
Moment?: Media and Entertainment Industry Shaken by Allegations, CNN (Oct. 18, 2018,
8:51 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/10/asia/india-metoo-intl/index.html [https://
perma.cc/EB6J-H87V].
33. See Ethan Krasnoo, Exploring the Role of Defamation in the #MeToo Narrative,
REAVIS PAGE JUMP LLP (Sept. 21, 2018), https://rpjlaw.com/exploring-defamation-metoonarrative/ [https://perma.cc/Z5QY-B5P9] (opining that “defamation will continue to play a
large role in the #MeToo movement”). Additionally, there are #MeToo defamation cases that
have only been heard on procedural matters, as of January 4, 2019. See, e.g., Bernstein v.
O’Reilly, 307 F. Supp. 3d 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (denying Bill O’Reilly’s motion to seal
particular agreements filed in connection with his motion to compel arbitration and/or dismiss
the complaint); Ex parte Moore, No. 1170638, 2018 WL 3947715 (Ala. Aug. 17, 2018)
(affirming the lower court’s denial of Roy Moore’s motion for change of venue). There are
also #MeToo defamation claims that have yet to be filed. See, e.g., Chappell, supra note 6
(explaining that Ashley Judd’s defamation suit against Harvey Weinstein will move forward);
James B. Stewart, Rachel Abrams & Ellen Gabler, “If Bobbie Talks, I’m Finished”: How Les
Moonves Tried to Silence an Accuser, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/11/28/business/les-moonves-bobbie-phillips-marv-dauer-cbs-severance.html
[https://perma.cc/6SVN-HWVP] (stating that Bobbie Phillips has hired a lawyer to pursue
defamation claims against Les Moonves).
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of defamation law and its use in the #MeToo era and explores how the factopinion distinction has evolved. Part II explores how courts have applied
fact-opinion analyses in defamation claims that are factually similar to
Milkovich, including in #MeToo cases. Finally, Part III proposes a factopinion analysis that is more consistent with Milkovich and that focuses on
the defamation defendant’s possession of undisclosed facts as a consequence
his34 role as a first-person witness in the underlying alleged sexual assault.
I. DEFAMATION LAW AND THE FACT-OPINION DISTINCTION
The First Amendment represents the United States’ strong cultural
interests in the freedom of speech.35 The right to free expression is balanced
against individuals’ common law right to reputation, which is protected
under defamation law.36
Alleged sexual assaulters have historically used defamation law against
their accusers. However, sexual assault accusers have begun using
defamation law against their alleged assaulters in the #MeToo era to protect
their own reputations from claims that they lied about their assaults.37 These
defamation suits have raised new legal questions38 but have more notably
perpetuated the inconsistent fact-opinion distinction.39
Part I.A provides a brief overview of defamation law. Part I.B then
outlines the use of defamation law in the context of sexual assault and
#MeToo defamation cases. Finally, Part I.C describes the critical Supreme
Court case Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. and its impact on the fact-opinion
distinction.
A. Defamation: A Mechanism for Reputational Protection
The law of defamation protects against the reputational harm that a written
or spoken statement causes to the subject of the statement.40 “Defamation”

34. But see Quentin Fottrell, A Difficult #MeToo Question: How Many Women Are
Accused of Sexual Harassment?, MARKETWATCH (Aug. 26, 2018, 6:42 PM), https://
www.marketwatch.com/story/a-difficult-metoo-question-how-many-women-are-accused-ofsexual-harassment-2018-08-21 [https://perma.cc/S6JN-YMF3] (demonstrating that women
have also been accused of sexual assault and explaining the difficulty of calculating how many
alleged assailants are women).
35. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
36. See Bryson Kern, Note, Reputational Injury Without Reputational Attack: Addressing
Negligence Claims for Pure Reputational Harm, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 253, 257–58 (2014)
(describing the importance of reputation and the harms resulting from an attack on reputation).
37. See infra Part I.B.
38. See infra Part I.B (discussing the self-defense privilege and attorneys’ liability under
defamation law for statements made on behalf of their clients, both issues which have been
raised in recent #MeToo defamation cases).
39. See infra Part II.
40. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines “defamation” as “[a] communication
[which] tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
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operates as a generic catchall term for the twin torts of libel and slander.41
Libel specifically refers to defamation through words embodied in a tangible
form, whether written or printed, and slander refers to defamation through
gestures or spoken words.42
At common law, defamation was “essentially a strict liability tort with
most rules stacked in the plaintiff’s favor.”43 The common law cause of
action required only an unprivileged, false, and defamatory publication that
was either “actionable irrespective of special harm” or was “the legal cause
of special harm to the other.”44 However, a common law plaintiff did not
have to show that the allegedly defamatory statement actually harmed their
reputation,45 was false,46 or was made with any degree of malice or fault.47
Thus, common law defamation enabled a plaintiff to prevail against a
defendant with relative ease.48
Beginning in 1964,49 a series of Supreme Court decisions placed First
Amendment restrictions on common law defamation, balancing the
traditional recognition of reputational interests with the constitutional
protection of free speech.50 New burdens were placed on defamation
plaintiffs with the introduction of new analytical elements,51 making it more
difficult for plaintiffs to prevail on their defamation claims. The modern
cause of action requires that a speaker communicate a false, defamatory, and
41. 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1:10 (2d ed. 2018). For the purpose of
this Note, “defamation” will act as a catchall term for both libel and slander. This Note uses
the terms “speaker” and “publisher” interchangeably, with no intent to invoke either written
or spoken statements specifically but rather to invoke defamatory or allegedly defamatory
statements generally. See also id. § 1:15 (further detailing how prima facie cases for libel and
slander differ).
42. Id. § 1:11.
43. Id. § 1:4.
44. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1938). In defamation law,
special harm refers to pecuniary loss “capable of being measured in money with approximate
exactness.” Id. § 575 cmt. b.
45. Id. § 559 cmt. d.
46. SMOLLA, supra note 41, § 1:8.
47. Id.
48. Id. § 1:7. Quoting Lord Mansfield, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. noted that, in
common law defamation, “[w]hatever a man publishes, he publishes at his peril.” Peck v.
Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 189 (1909).
49. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
50. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 22 (1990) (reiterating the Supreme
Court’s “recognition of the [First] Amendment’s vital guarantee of free and uninhibited
discussion of public issues” and recognizing societal interest in reputation as “another side to
the equation”); see also SMOLLA, supra note 41, § 1:1 (stating that “[a] free, open, and decent
society values the free exchange of news and information, but also demands avenues of redress
for damaging falsehoods”). Contrast with Australia’s “strict defamation laws,” which require
“the publisher to prove that the [defamation] allegations are true [and] ‘can be used to stymie
public debate.’” Clarissa Sebag-Montefiore, Geoffrey Rush’s Defamation Trial Becomes a
#MeToo Reckoning for Australia, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/11/06/world/australia/geoffrey-rush-metoo-defamation.html [https://perma.cc/LWL75FCL] (quoting Matt Collins, a Victoria-based defamation lawyer).
51. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80 (establishing that public official plaintiffs must prove
that allegedly defamatory statements were made with a fault level of “actual malice,” with
knowledge or reckless disregard as to a statement’s falsity).
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unprivileged statement to another with fault consisting of, at minimum,
negligence.52 Further, the relevant constitutional minimum requirements
change depending on whether a plaintiff is a public or private person53 and
whether the defamatory speech concerns a public or private matter.54
Additionally, states vary as to whether they impose a stricter fault
requirement than actual malice and when they impose special harm
requirements.55
Defamation has therefore evolved to incorporate more free speech
protections, to the defendant’s benefit.
B. Defamation Law’s Use in the #MeToo Era
Historically, alleged sexual assaulters, rather than their accusers, have
utilized defamation lawsuits where an alleged sexual assault underlies the
defamation claim.56 In response to being accused of sexual assault, alleged
assailants file defamation suits against their accusers to protect their own
reputations.57
The possibility of such retaliation58 discourages victims from reporting
their sexual assaults.59 With defamation suits, accused assaulters can
circumvent rape shield laws designed to prevent admission of victims’ past
sexual histories as evidence in sexual assault cases.60 This is because rape
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). The exact
requirements include “(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an
unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part
of the publisher; and (d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or
the existence of special harm caused by the publication.” Id.
53. See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (extending the “actual
malice” fault requirement to public figures).
54. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44 (1971) (extending the “actual
malice” fault requirement to private persons making claims regarding allegedly defamatory
statements about matters of public concern).
55. SMOLLA, supra note 41, § 1:34.
56. See Jackson, supra note 11.
57. Id.
58. Other forms of retaliation in response to reporting sexual assaults include further
sexual assault, threats, and violence. Leah M. Slyder, Note, Rape in the Civil and
Administrative Contexts: Proposed Solutions to Problems in Tort Cases Brought by Rape
Survivors, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 543, 552 (2017).
59. In 2016, about 80 percent of sexual assaults and rapes went unreported, making it the
most underreported violent crime. RACHEL E. MORGAN & GRACE KENA, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, NCJ 252121, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2016: REVISED 7 (2018), https://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv16re.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YR4-2UVT] (reporting that in
2016, 23.2 percent of rapes or sexual assaults were reported, compared with 57 percent of
robberies, 43.9 percent of assaults, 52.2 percent of domestic violence crimes, 43.6 percent of
stranger violence crimes, and 48 percent of violent crimes involving injury). Although
reporting inconsistencies make it difficult to accurately measure how frequently sexual
assaults are falsely reported, statistics show that false reporting rates range between 2 and 10
percent. NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RES. CTR., FALSE REPORTING 3 (2012), https://
www.nsvrc.org/sites/default/files/Publications_NSVRC_Overview_False-Reporting.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7F8L-SXEP].
60. Slyder, supra note 58, at 553–54 (describing a case where the alleged sexual assaulter
sued his accuser for defamation and “[t]he trial focused on the role that [the victim] played in
her own sexual assault”); see also Leslie Berkseth et al., Rape and Sexual Assault, 18 GEO. J.
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shield laws, which are relatively weak to begin with,61 do not extend to civil
proceedings in most states.62
The threat of defamation suits thus operates as a strong deterrent63 to
sexual assault victims bringing claims against their assaulters.64 For
example, as a possible backlash to the #MeToo movement, alleged sexual
assaulters on college campuses are now more likely to file defamation suits
against victims who report their assaulters.65 Likewise, public figures
accused of sexual assault have also brought defamation suits against their
alleged victims.66
However, alleged sexual assault victims have also recently begun turning
to defamation claims as a cause of action against their alleged assaulters.67
These defamation suits raise other legal questions, in addition to the factopinion distinction, that have not yet been thoroughly explored.
One example is the common law self-defense privilege.68 In some
jurisdictions, defamation defendants may successfully claim this defense if
GENDER & L. 743, 799 (2017) (stating that “rape shield laws do not generally protect civil
litigants”).
61. See Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual
Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 55 (2002) (stating that “rape
shield laws admit[] evidence of the sexual history between the complainant and the defendant
himself”). Anderson also argues against certain provisions in Rule 412 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence that allow sexual history to be admitted as evidence under certain circumstances.
Id. at 55–56.
62. Slyder, supra note 58, at 553–54.
63. Other strong deterrents to reporting sexual assault include victim-blaming and
victimization by the criminal justice system itself. Id. at 550–53. Dr. Christine Blasey Ford,
who testified at Kavanaugh’s confirmation hearing that he sexually assaulted her in high
school, is a notable example of an alleged sexual assault victim who was publicly victimblamed. See Full Transcript: Christine Blasey Ford’s Opening Statement to the Senate
Judiciary Committee, supra note 8. Dr. Ford noted in her opening statement, “I have had to
relive my trauma in front of the entire world, and have seen my life picked apart by people on
television, in the media, and in [the Senate Judiciary Committee] who have never met me or
spoken with me.” Id.
64. But see Mark Morales, #MeToo Cited as One Reason Rape Reports Increased 22% in
New York in 2018, CNN (Jan. 3, 2019, 7:07 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/03/us/nypdcrime-stats-briefing/index.html [https://perma.cc/9PWU-UVT4] (describing the #MeToo
movement’s positive effect on increased rape reports in New York City in 2018).
65. See Kelly Alison Behre, Ensuring Choice and Voice for Campus Sexual Assault
Victims: A Call for Victims’ Attorneys, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 293, 356–61 (2017).
66. See, e.g., Maggie Astor, Roy Moore Sues 4 Women, Claiming Defamation and
Conspiracy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/30/
us/politics/roy-moore-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/2QVC-AUP6]; Daniel Kreps, Drake
Files Fraud Lawsuit Against Woman Over False Pregnancy, Rape Claims, ROLLING STONE
(Sept. 19, 2018, 2:29 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/drake-fraudlawsuit-false-pregnancy-rape-claims-726305/ [https://perma.cc/6BFW-5CE5].
67. See Jackson, supra note 11; infra Part II. One sexual assault victim described her
decision to come forward about her alleged assault by Les Moonves: “The moment I read that
there were other women [Les Moonves] had victimized, the light bulb went off . . . . I had to
grapple with the fact that I had allowed the same monster to victimize me twice, in the 1990s
and once again some 20 years later.” See Stewart, Abrams & Gabler, supra note 33.
68. See, e.g., McKee v. Cosby, 236 F. Supp. 3d 427, 443 (D. Mass. 2017), aff’d, 874 F.3d
54 (1st Cir. 2017); Green v. Cosby, 138 F. Supp. 3d 114, 140–42 (D. Mass. 2015); see also
Clay Calvert, Counterspeech, Cosby, and Libel Law: Some Lessons About “Pure Opinion”
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they made their allegedly defamatory statement to defend their own
reputations.69 In #MeToo defamation cases, the self-defense argument is that
the alleged assailant was protecting their own reputation by calling their
accuser a liar—so they cannot be liable for defamation.70
Courts have come to inconsistent conclusions on whether an alleged
assailant who calls their accuser a liar can properly claim the self-defense
privilege. The court in Green v. Cosby addressed the self-defense argument
at the motion to dismiss stage, where the plaintiff’s allegations, in this case
sexual assault allegations, are presumed to be true.71 The court noted that,
when a defendant’s allegedly defamatory statement includes material they
know or believe is false, they cannot successfully claim the self-defense
privilege.72 Accordingly, the court stated that Cosby could not invoke the
self-defense privilege at the motion to dismiss stage.73 However, the court
in McKee v. Cosby74 felt differently, asserting that individuals cannot be
limited to “no comment” statements when responding to public sexual assault
allegations.75
Another legal issue in #MeToo defamation cases is an attorney’s potential
defamation liability for making statements on behalf of their clients to defend
them against sexual assault allegations. This question has been raised in Bill
Cosby’s #MeToo defamation cases, where Cosby’s attorney, Martin Singer,
either explicitly or implicitly called Cosby’s accusers liars to defend Cosby
against sexual assault allegations.76 In most of these cases, Cosby was the
only named defendant, and the courts treated Singer’s statements as being
made by Cosby because Singer made them on Cosby’s behalf in the scope of

& Resuscitating the Self-Defense Privilege, 69 FLA. L. REV. 151, 170–78 (2017) (arguing that
the self-defense privilege should apply to #MeToo “liar” statements in defamation cases);
Kristina T. Pham & Kevin D. Whittaker, Will Defamation Claims in the #MeToo Movement
Revive the Self-Defense Privilege for Employers?, 2018 EMERGING ISSUES 8669 (predicting a
resurgence of the self-defense privilege that may benefit employers).
69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 594 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). Not all
jurisdictions recognize the self-defense privilege. See, e.g., Green, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 140–41
(rejecting Cosby’s self-defense argument because the applicable Florida law does not
recognize the self-defense privilege).
70. See Green, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 140–42.
71. Id. at 142.
72. Id. (citing ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION § 9:2.1 (4th ed. 2010)).
73. Id.
74. 236 F. Supp. 3d 427 (D. Mass. 2017), aff’d, 874 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2017).
75. Id. at 443. Despite the conflicting outcomes in these #MeToo cases, the common law
self-defense privilege may ultimately be favorable to #MeToo defamation suit defendants.
The common law requires that a reply to a defamatory statement (1) be directed only at the
initial defamatory attack, without adding irrelevant statements; (2) be proportional to the
defamatory attack, and (3) be directed to the appropriate—and not an unnecessarily wide—
audience. Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 37 F.3d 1541, 1559–63 (4th Cir. 1994). Under
the proportionality requirement, a defendant may properly allege that their attacker “is an
unmitigated liar.” Id. at 1562 (citing PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 115 (5th
ed. 1984)).
76. See Hill v. Cosby, 665 F. App’x 169 (3d Cir. 2016); McKee, 236 F. Supp. 3d 427;
Green, 138 F. Supp. 3d 114; Dickinson v. Cosby, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 430 (Ct. App. 2017).
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his role as Cosby’s attorney.77 Ultimately, whether attorneys can themselves
be liable for defamation when acting on behalf of their client for their client’s
benefit remains largely unexplored.78
C. Fact and Opinion: Fair Comment, Milkovich, and Varying Tests
Common law courts used fact-opinion analyses to determine whether
defamation defendants successfully claimed protection under the fair
comment privilege.79 Later, beginning in the latter half of the twentieth
century, the Supreme Court took on the task of defining and clarifying that
distinction.80 However, a clear framework for determining whether
statements constitute fact or opinion has eluded courts.81
Part I.C.1 describes the common law fact-opinion analysis. Part I.C.2
explains how the Supreme Court case Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.
sought to change the common law fact-opinion analysis. Finally, Part I.C.3
describes how little effect Milkovich had on the fact-opinion analysis.
1. The Fact-Opinion Distinction’s Origins in the Common Law
Until 1964, when the Supreme Court first acknowledged constitutional
protection for opinions,82 the fact-opinion distinction existed exclusively
under the common law. At common law, the fair comment defense protected
a defamation defendant’s right to publicly discuss certain public subjects,
even if done in a defamatory manner.83 Fair comment was the common law’s
principal mechanism for balancing the need for public discourse with the
need to redress reputational harm to individuals.84 A defendant could
successfully claim this qualified privilege by showing that the statement at
issue concerned a matter of public interest, the statement was based on facts
either stated or known to the audience, the statement was the defendant’s
opinion, and the defendant’s sole motivation for the statement was not to
harm the plaintiff.85

77. See Hill, 665 F. App’x at 175–76; McKee, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 434; Green, 138 F. Supp.
3d at 118.
78. For an article opining that an attorney should not be liable for defamation when
speaking for their client, see Calvert, supra note 68, at 165.
79. See infra notes 83–86.
80. See infra Part I.C.2.
81. SMOLLA, supra note 41, § 6:1.
82. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964) (determining “for the first time
the extent to which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State’s power to
award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official
conduct”); see also Robert D. Sack, Protection of Opinion Under the First Amendment:
Reflections on Alfred Hill, “Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment,” 100
COLUM. L. REV. 294, 305 (2000) (explaining the Supreme Court’s concern for protection of
opinion in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan).
83. Rodney W. Ott, Note, Fact and Opinion in Defamation: Recognizing the Formative
Power of Context, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 763 (1990).
84. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 14 (1990).
85. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 606 (AM. LAW INST. 1938).
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Fair comment protected pure, as opposed to mixed, opinion.86 Pure
opinion included two types of statements. First, where the speaker states
facts and expresses an opinion based on those facts.87 Second, where the
speaker does not express the facts on which the opinion is based, but the
particular facts are either assumed due to their notoriety or known because
another person has stated them.88 Statements implying the existence of
undisclosed facts unknown to their audience were referred to as mixed
opinion and, unlike pure opinion, were actionable for defamation.89
In famous dictum from Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,90 the Supreme Court
unwittingly laid the groundwork for blanket nonactionability of pure opinion
when it stated:
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the
conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But
there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.91

The Gertz dictum was widely read92 to say that statements of pure opinion
were not actionable, effectively rendering the fair comment privilege
unconstitutional.93 In 1977, the Restatement (Second) of Torts rejected the
possibility of actionable pure opinion94 and instead clarified that opinions are
“actionable only if [they] impl[y] the allegation of undisclosed defamatory
facts as the basis for the opinion.”95 Courts subsequently attempted to
formulate tests for distinguishing fact and opinion pursuant to the Gertz
dictum and Restatement.96
The D.C. Circuit’s en banc decision in Ollman v. Evans97 greatly
influenced the interpretation and application of the fact-opinion distinction.
Judge Kenneth Starr, writing for the majority, interpreted Gertz as implying
86. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (explaining
that fair comment was held to apply to pure opinions).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.; see also infra notes 159–63 and accompanying text (expanding on the difference
between pure and mixed opinion).
90. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
91. Id. at 339–40.
92. The Gertz dictum “had a deep, virtually instantaneous impact on the law of
defamation.” ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION § 4:2.3 (5th ed. 2017). For a list of
cases ultimately holding in accordance with the idea that opinions are not actionable under the
Constitution, see Sack, supra note 82, at 313 nn.102–09.
93. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmts. b–c (AM. LAW INST. 1977). After
the Supreme Court issued its Gertz opinion, courts began explicitly holding that Gertz
rendered fair comment obsolete, referring to fair comment in their opinions but ultimately
deciding the cases based on the Constitution or declaring fair comment superfluous. SACK,
supra note 92, § 4:2.3.
94. See Sack, supra note 82, at 310.
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see id. § 566 cmt. b.
96. See supra note 92 and accompanying text; see also Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970,
977 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (describing the different methods employed by courts to
distinguish fact from opinion as including judgment calls, single factors like verifiability, and
multifactor tests).
97. 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc).
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a constitutional duty “to distinguish facts from opinions in order to provide
opinions with the requisite, absolute First Amendment protection.”98 The
court discussed the problems with different ways of distinguishing between
fact and opinion. Bright-line rules fail to account for the complexity and
richness of the English language, in which words can mean different things
in different contexts.99 However, analyses based on judgment calls or that
articulate a complex rule may have an unwanted deterrent effect on free
speech because it would be impossible for the public to predict what a court
might deem permissible.100 The Ollman court thus settled on a four-factor
test to guide its analysis of whether a statement constituted fact or opinion.101
The Ollman test considers these four factors: (1) the statement’s specific
language, including its common usage; (2) the statement’s verifiability; (3)
the allegedly defamatory statement in the full context of its entire publication;
and (4) the broader context of the statement’s publication, including the
implications of social conventions.102 These factors still greatly influence
courts’ fact-opinion analyses.103
Two years later, in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,104 the
Supreme Court determined that, under the Constitution, the plaintiff has the
burden of proving an allegedly defamatory statement’s falsity, at least in
media cases involving matters of public concern.105 The Hepps holding
marked a further shift from common law defamation, which did not require
the plaintiff to prove falsity.106
2. The Supreme Court’s Fact-Opinion Analysis in Milkovich
The Supreme Court finally addressed the fact-opinion distinction in
Milkovich, where the defendant was sued for defamation because he called
the plaintiff a liar.107
Michael Milkovich, a high school wrestling coach, had testified at an
athletics association hearing regarding a violent altercation at a wrestling
match involving his team.108 The association then put the team on
probation.109 Subsequently, after parents and wrestlers sued the association
and Milkovich also testified in that proceeding, the association’s unfavorable
ruling was overturned.110
98. Id. at 975.
99. Id. at 974–78.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 979.
102. Id.
103. See Sack, supra note 82, at 316 nn.115–16 (listing court opinions using the same or
similar factors in their fact-opinion analyses). But see Ott, supra note 83, at 781–84
(discussing divergent applications of the Ollman factors).
104. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
105. Id. at 768–69.
106. See SMOLLA, supra note 41, § 1:8.
107. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1990).
108. Id. at 3–4.
109. Id. at 4.
110. Id.
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The next day, a local newspaper published an article written by a
columnist, J. Theodore Diadiun, who was present at the wrestling match and
at the athletics association hearing.111 The column, entitled “Maple Beat the
Law with the ‘Big Lie,’” claimed that Milkovich had perjured himself at the
court proceeding.112 In the column, Diadiun stated that “anyone who
attended the . . . wrestling meet” learned a lesson: “If you get in a jam, lie
your way out. If you’re successful enough, and powerful enough, and can
sound sincere enough, you stand an excellent chance of making the lie stand
up, regardless of what really happened.”113 Towards the end of the article,
Diadiun reiterated that “[a]nyone who attended the meet . . . knows in his
heart that Milkovich . . . lied at the hearing.”114
The Supreme Court used Milkovich as an opportunity to reject the
widespread interpretation that Gertz created a blanket constitutional
protection for all opinion.115 Chief Justice William Rehnquist explained,
“we do not think this [dictum] from Gertz was intended to create a wholesale
defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled ‘opinion’” and that
“such an interpretation . . . would . . . ignore . . . that expressions of ‘opinion’
may often imply an assertion of objective fact.”116
The Court demonstrated how an expression of opinion could imply a
factual assertion. First, the Court explained that the statement, “In my
opinion John Jones is a liar,” could imply a false assertion of fact.117 Even
if the speaker states the facts on which this opinion is based, those facts could
be incorrect or incomplete, or the speaker could have incorrectly evaluated
the facts.118 Second, the Court explained that a statement cannot be protected
simply because its speaker specifically contextualizes it as an opinion.119 If
an opinion implies a false assertion of fact, it can be harmful to one’s
reputation, regardless of whether it was prefaced with “In my opinion” or “I
think.”120
The Court further opined that existing constitutional doctrine sufficiently
protected First Amendment rights. The Milkovich Court noted that Hepps
provides constitutional protection for “statement[s] of opinion relating to
matters of public concern which do[] not contain a provably false factual
connotation.”121 Additional Supreme Court cases provide constitutional
protection against statements that contain “rhetorical hyperbole” and that
cannot, therefore, be “interpreted as stating actual facts” about a person.122
Finally, Supreme Court cases establishing fault requirements for statements
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 3; see also id. at 28 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 4 (majority opinion).
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 18–19.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id. (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50, 53–55 (1988)).
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of opinion regarding matters of both public concern and public figures or
officials provide further constitutional protection for “robust” “debate on
public issues.”123
Accordingly, the Court rejected the use of factor tests commonly used by
lower courts to identify statements of opinion124 and clarified that “[t]he
dispositive question [is] whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that
the statements in the . . . column imply an assertion that petitioner Milkovich
perjured himself in a judicial proceeding.”125 In other words, could a
reasonable factfinder conclude that an allegedly defamatory statement
implied an assertion of fact?126
In applying this question to the Milkovich facts, the Supreme Court
emphasized that Diadiun’s failure to use “loose, figurative, or hyperbolic
language” and the article’s “general tenor” would indicate to a reader that
Diadiun “was seriously maintaining that [Milkovich] committed the crime of
perjury.”127 The Court further concluded that Diadiun’s perjury claim could
be proved true or false, based on a comparison of Milkovich’s testimony
before the athletics association and his testimony before the court.128 It thus
concluded that Diadiun’s “liar” statement was actionable.129
Notably, the Supreme Court did not use two pieces of context on which a
lower court had relied in finding that Diadiun’s column constituted
nonactionable opinion. In Scott v. News-Herald,130 a sister case to Milkovich,
the Supreme Court of Ohio considered Diadiun’s article in a defamation suit
brought by H. Don Scott, the school superintendent who testified with
Milkovich at both the athletics association hearing and at court and was also
a target of Diadiun’s column.131 The U.S. Supreme Court noted that the Ohio
Supreme Court relied on the large caption accompanying Diadiun’s article,
“TD Says,” as well as the article’s placement in the newspaper’s sports
section, which is “a traditional haven for cajoling, invective, and
hyperbole.”132 Despite its awareness of the Ohio Supreme Court’s use of
these pieces of context, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to incorporate them
into its own analysis of the column.133
In a dissenting opinion, Justice William Brennan agreed with the factopinion rule set out by Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion but

123. Id. (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
124. Id. at 19. The court opined that these factor tests create an “artificial dichotomy”
between fact and opinion. Id.
125. Id. at 21.
126. Scholars note that, despite the Court’s desire to eliminate the “artificial dichotomy”
of factors tests, its own dispositive question does not actually accomplish this objective. See
Sack, supra note 82, at 322–25.
127. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 19.
130. 496 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio 1986).
131. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 8.
132. Id. at 9 (quoting Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 707–08).
133. See infra notes 351–56 and accompanying text.
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disagreed with its application to the facts in Milkovich.134 In particular, he
disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that Diadiun’s statements implied a
factual assertion that Milkovich lied.135 Justice Brennan acknowledged that
Diadiun revealed facts on which the columnist relied, including that Diadiun
was personally present at the wrestling match where the infamous incident
occurred and at the athletics association hearing.136 However, Justice
Brennan also emphasized that Diadiun’s statement shows where the
columnist began guessing and pointed to language like “probably” and
“apparently,” to the statement’s tone, and to contextual details like the “TD
Says” caption.137 Justice Brennan also found it problematic that Diadiun did
not personally attend the court hearing, did not quote testimony from the
hearing, and did not have any detailed secondhand information about
Milkovich’s court statements.138 Based on these details, Justice Brennan
concluded that Diadiun’s statements could not reasonably be interpreted to
imply an assertion of fact.
3. An Unchanged Landscape: Fact-Opinion Analyses After Milkovich
Milkovich’s impact was relatively subtle and did not alleviate the
confusion around the fact-opinion distinction.139 Although Milkovich
rejected a blanket protection for opinion, opinions not implying underlying
facts still receive constitutional protection since they cannot be proved true
or false.140 Therefore, Milkovich merely shifted the analysis to focus on
whether allegedly defamatory statements contain provably false factual
assertions.141
Courts tend to rely on Milkovich so far as it requires that actionable
statements contain provably false assertions of fact and provides that
rhetorical language is not actionable.142 However, courts continue to rely on
pre-Milkovich case law to assess whether a statement is provably false.143
Hence, courts still use factors like those applied in Ollman,144 along with
other fact-opinion tests, despite the Supreme Court’s disapproval of them.145

134. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 25 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 28.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 29, 32.
138. Id. at 29–30.
139. SMOLLA, supra note 41, § 6:2; see also Sack, supra note 82, at 322 (stating that
“Milkovich had little impact on the law”).
140. See SACK, supra note 92, § 4:2.4.
141. SMOLLA, supra note 41, § 6:2; see also The Supreme Court, 1989 Term—Leading
Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 129, 219 (1990) (opining that, “[b]ecause the criteria used by lower
courts since Gertz to distinguish fact from opinion are consistent with Milkovich’s limitations,
the law of defamation will remain essentially the same in many jurisdictions”).
142. SACK, supra note 92, § 4:2.4.
143. Id.
144. See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc).
145. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 479 U.S. 1, 19 (1990).
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Three basic fact-opinion approaches persist in state courts: the
verifiability test, the undisclosed defamatory facts test, and the totality of the
circumstances test.146
Jurisdictions like Illinois147 and New Jersey148 use fact-opinion tests
emphasizing verifiability, where courts are more likely to find statements
actionable if they are capable of being proved true or false, and statements
are protected from liability if they are not verifiable.149 This test requires a
determination as to whether the statement suggests specific factual assertions
that can be proved true or false.150 Additionally, statements are less likely to
be found actionable if they are determined to contain “loose, figurative or
hyperbolic language.”151 A final element is whether the audience would
reasonably interpret a statement to have a defamatory meaning, which courts
assess by considering the context in which the statement appears.152
Some states, such as Georgia,153 Pennsylvania,154 and Washington155 rely
on disclosure, the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to the factopinion analysis.156 Under this test, courts are likely to find a statement
actionable if it fails to disclose the underlying defamatory facts serving as the
basis of the opinion.157 The Restatement further expands this test by
distinguishing between pure and mixed opinions.158 Pure opinions are those
in which the audience knows the underlying facts, either because the speaker
disclosed them or because they were already aware of them.159 Mixed
opinions fail to explicitly disclose, but still imply, the existence of underlying
defamatory facts.160
This distinction is important because it highlights that an opinion’s impact
on its audience varies depending on whether it communicates the underlying
facts. If the statement of opinion discloses the underlying facts on which the
opinion is based, the audience is less likely to perceive it as a defamatory
factual statement.161 For example, the Restatement provides the following
146. Ott, supra note 83, at 770–74. Ott’s note predated the Supreme Court’s issuance of
its Milkovich opinion by a matter of months. A post-Milkovich analysis of state court factopinion tests distinguishes eight different categories. Kathryn Dix Sowle, A Matter of
Opinion: Milkovich Four Years Later, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 467, 499–552 (1994).
Most of these factors can be condensed into the three categories described by Ott.
147. See Solaia Tech., LLC v. Specialty Publ’g Co., 852 N.E.2d 825, 840 (Ill. 2006).
148. See DeAngelis v. Hill, 847 A.2d 1261, 1269 (N.J. 2004).
149. Ott, supra note 83, at 770–71.
150. SMOLLA, supra note 41, § 6:45.
151. Id.
152. Id.; see also DeAngelis, 847 A.2d at 1268.
153. See Davita Inc. v. Nephrology Assocs., P.C., 253 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1374 (S.D. Ga.
2003).
154. See Sprague v. Porter, No. 02930, 2013 WL 6143734, at *8 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Nov. 1,
2013).
155. See Dunlap v. Wayne, 716 P.2d 842, 847 (Wash. 1986) (en banc).
156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
157. Id.
158. Id. § 566 cmt. b.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. § 566 cmt. c.
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illustration: “A writes to B about his neighbor C: ‘I think he must be an
alcoholic.’”162 The audience, B, could reasonably conclude that A’s opinion
is based on undisclosed facts—perhaps A saw C acting in a manner that
would support his opinion that C is an alcoholic. Compare with the following
scenario: “A says to B about C, a city official: ‘He and his wife took a trip
on city business a month ago and he added her expenses in as a part of his
own.’ B responds: ‘If he did that he is really a thief.’”163 Here, the audience,
A, would likely understand that B’s opinion is based purely on the facts that
A himself provided, and that B is therefore not implying a statement of
defamatory fact.
Finally, some states, like Massachusetts,164 California,165 and New
York,166 use the totality of the circumstances fact-opinion analysis. Under
this test, courts weigh a number of factors to determine whether the allegedly
defamatory statement is actionable for defamation.167 These factors can
include any combination of the statement’s literary context, existence of
cautionary terms, the statement’s social context, verifiability, and whether
the statement consists of rhetorical hyperbole.168
II. FACT OR OPINION?: DIFFERING ANALYSES AND DIVERGING RESULTS IN
#METOO DEFAMATION CASES
Of the eleven existing defamation cases predicated on a claim that the
accuser is a liar,169 eight arise from #MeToo-era sexual assault accusations
and three arise from accusations of criminal conduct, including sexual
assault, that arose prior to the #MeToo wave in fall 2017.170 This Part
discusses the eight cases that addressed the fact-opinion distinction.171
In five of the remaining eight cases, the plaintiff prevailed on the factopinion question. However, in three others, including cases decided in the
162. Id. § 566 illus. 3.
163. Id. § 566 illus. 5.
164. See Lyons v. Globe Newspaper Co., 612 N.E.2d 1158, 1162 (Mass. 1993).
165. See Overhill Farms, Inc. v. Lopez, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 127, 139 (Ct. App. 2010).
166. See Davis v. Boeheim, 22 N.E.3d 999, 1005 (N.Y. 2014) (explaining that New York
has “adopted a holistic approach” to the fact-opinion analysis).
167. SMOLLA, supra note 41, § 6:47; see also supra note 146 and accompanying text.
168. SMOLLA, supra note 41, § 6:47.
169. This count does not include Milkovich.
170. See infra Parts II.A–B. This count only includes defamation cases with opinions
issued as of September 19, 2019.
171. Two of the eleven cases did not address the fact-opinion distinction. As of September
19, 2019, one of these cases has addressed only procedural matters. See Ex parte Moore, No.
1170638, 2018 WL 3947715 (Ala. Aug. 17, 2018) (affirming a lower court’s denial of Roy
Moore’s motion for change of venue). One case was dismissed. See Katelyn Caralle, Judge
Throws Out Defamation Lawsuit Against Bill O’Reilly, Fox News: It Is ‘Wholly Insufficient,’
WASH. EXAMINER (Mar. 6, 2019, 9:42 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/
judge-throws-out-defamation-lawsuit-against-bill-oreilly-fox-news [https://perma.cc/5KUULYHS]. Finally, one defamation suit brought against Alan Dershowitz in April 2019 is
pending as of September 26, 2019. See Tom Winter & Rich Schapiro, Alan Dershowitz: My
Sex Abuse Accuser Has Hurt the ‘Me Too’ Movement, NBC NEWS (Sept. 24, 2019, 1:32 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/alan-dershowitz-my-sex-abuse-accuser-has-hurtme-too-n1058226 [perma.cc/VW8R-5YJG].
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First Circuit, Third Circuit, and the Central District of California, the
defendant prevailed on the fact-opinion analysis.
Part II.A will assess how the fact-opinion analysis was conducted in cases
where the court determined that a “liar” allegation was actionable. Part II.B
will examine how the fact-opinion analysis was implemented in cases where
the court determined that a “liar” allegation was not actionable.
A. Actionable “Liar” Statements
In each of the following cases, the court rejected the defendant’s argument
that his “liar” statement constituted opinion, finding instead that the “liar”
statement was actionable fact.
Parts II.A.1 and II.A.2 examine fact-opinion analyses in pre-#MeToo cases
where the plaintiff accused the defendant, or another person close to the
defendant, of committing a crime, and the defendant subsequently called the
plaintiff a liar. Parts II.A.3, II.A.4, and II.A.5 examine courts’ fact-opinion
analyses in #MeToo defamation cases.
1. Actionable Fact in Davis v. Boeheim
In Davis v. Boeheim,172 the New York Court of Appeals found that,
pursuant to a fact-opinion analysis, the allegedly defamatory statements at
issue were actionable.173 The statements were made by Syracuse University
and James Boeheim, the university’s head basketball coach, in response to
the plaintiffs’ claims of sexual abuse by Bernie Fine, the associate head
coach.174 The plaintiffs, Robert Davis and Michael Lang, alleged that the
abuse happened in the 1980s, when they were about eleven years old and
continued for almost twenty years.175 In 2005, Davis reported the abuse to
the university’s new chancellor, but the university concluded a few months
later that the allegations were unfounded.176 In 2011, the claims resurfaced
and Boeheim publicly stated, “‘Bernie [Fine] has my full support,’ and that
he had known Fine for over 40 years and had ‘never seen or witnessed
anything to suggest that [Fine] would be involved in any of the activities
alleged.’”177 Boeheim also said that he “would have taken action” if he had
known of such conduct.178 Boeheim further called the plaintiffs liars and
claimed that their allegations were financially motivated.179
Davis and Lang then commenced a defamation action against Boeheim
and the university, who in turn filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that
the statements were not defamatory because they constituted nonactionable

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

22 N.E.3d 999 (N.Y. 2014).
Id. at 1001.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1002.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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opinions.180 The trial court granted the motion, and the appellate division
affirmed, determining that based on the totality of the circumstances, a
reasonable reader could conclude that the statements constituted
nonactionable opinion.181 Davis and Lang argued that, contrary to the lower
courts’ opinions, the statements constituted actionable facts or mixed
opinion.182
The New York Court of Appeals agreed with Davis and Lang.183 Using a
totality of the circumstances test, it examined: (1) whether the specific
language of the statement had a readily understood, precise meaning; (2)
whether the statements were capable of being proved true or false; and (3)
whether the published or broader social context indicated to a reader that the
statement was more likely to be opinion rather than fact.184
The court determined that the first factor was satisfied because Boeheim
used “specific, easily understood language to communicate that Davis and
Lang lied, their motive was financial gain, and Davis had made prior similar
statements for the same reason.”185 The court also found that the second
factor was met because Boeheim’s assertions that the plaintiffs were
motivated by money and that Davis had made false statements in the past
were capable of being proved true or false.186
In analyzing the third factor, the court invoked the pure and mixed opinion
distinction laid out in the Restatement187 and determined that Boeheim’s
Specifically, a
statements constituted actionable mixed opinion.188
reasonable reader could understand Boeheim to be speaking with authority
and based on undisclosed facts, given his status as a well-respected member
of the university.189 Additionally, Boeheim’s position as head coach left him
“well placed to have information about the charges” and the fact that his
statement was released before the university’s statement would suggest that
he had access to otherwise confidential information.190 Further, Boeheim’s
longtime friendship with Fine suggested that he based his statements on
particular details known to him because of that existing relationship.191
Finally, because these statements were published in news-related articles,
rather than an op-ed or letter to the editor, the reasonable reader would be
more willing to conclude that they stated or implied facts.192
180. Id. at 1002–03.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1005.
185. Id. at 1006.
186. Id.
187. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmts. b–c (AM. LAW INST. 1977)
(explaining that the difference between pure and mixed opinions is that pure, nonactionable,
opinions disclose underlying facts whereas mixed, actionable opinions fail to disclose
underlying facts but imply to their audience that they exist).
188. Davis, 22 N.E.3d at 1007.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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The New York Court of Appeals thus concluded that Boeheim’s
allegations that the plaintiffs lied were actionable under a totality of the
circumstances fact-opinion analysis in light of the statement’s specific
language, verifiability, and literary and social context.193
2. Actionable Fact in Giuffre v. Maxwell
In Giuffre v. Maxwell,194 the Southern District of New York concluded
that Ghislaine Maxwell’s claim that Virginia Giuffre lied when she claimed
Maxwell was involved in her sexual abuse was actionable.195 Giuffre, an
alleged victim of Jeffrey Epstein’s sex trafficking ring,196 had experienced
repeated sexual abuse when she was a minor over the span of about three
years and publicly alleged that Maxwell was involved in her trafficking.197
In response, Maxwell stated through her agent that these allegations were
“untrue,” were “shown to be untrue,” and that the “claims are obvious
lies.”198
Subsequently, Giuffre filed a defamation claim against Maxwell, and
Maxwell filed a motion to dismiss, claiming in part that the allegedly
defamatory statements were not actionable.199 Whereas Maxwell claimed
her statements did not actually call Giuffre a liar, Giuffre argued they
effectively did, and the court settled the question through a fact-opinion
analysis.200
The court employed the same totality of the circumstances test used in
Davis v. Boeheim and determined that the statements were actionable.201
First, the statement was readily understood to have the factual meaning that
Giuffre lied about Maxwell’s involvement with Giuffre’s sexual abuse, “and
that some verifiable investigation . . . occurred and [came] to a definitive
conclusion proving that fact.”202 Further, although Maxwell did not use the
word “liar,” her claims that Giuffre’s allegations were “obvious lies” and had

193. See id. at 1002–03, 1005.
194. 165 F. Supp. 3d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
195. Id. at 152. This case subsequently settled in May 2017. Kat Tenbarge, Epstein Files
Unsealed: Thousands of Accusers’ Documents Have Been Released from the Defamation Suit
Against His Ex-Girlfriend and Alleged ‘Madam,’ BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 9, 2019, 10:42 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/epstein-giuffre-v-maxwell-unsealed-thousands-documentsdefamation-2019-8 [https://perma.cc/YB83-Z4BH]. In August 2019, court documents from
this case were unsealed, revealing thousands of pages worth of details about accusations from
multiple women and involving a number of high-profile men, including Donald Trump and
Prince Andrew. See id.
196. See Sheila Dang et al., Jeffrey Epstein Accuser Links Powerful Men to Financier:
Civil Court Filing, REUTERS (Aug. 9, 2019, 3:05 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uspeople-jeffrey-epstein-documents/jeffrey-epstein-accuser-links-powerful-men-to-financiercivil-court-filing-idUSKCN1UZ27X [https://perma.cc/62SG-T4KM].
197. Giuffre, 165 F. Supp. 3d at 150.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 151.
201. Id. at 151–52.
202. Id. at 152.
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been “shown to be untrue” amounted to the same thing, as Giuffre’s
allegations could not be shown to be untrue without her being a liar.203
Second, the statements were capable of being proved true or false: “Sexual
assault of a minor is a clear-cut issue; either transgression occurred or it did
not. Either Maxwell was involved or she was not. The issue is not a matter
of opinion . . . . The answer depends on facts.”204
Third, the statements’ context would indicate to an audience that facts, not
opinions, were being communicated. This is because Maxwell’s agent
crafted a press release with the intention of releasing it to the media to
publicly refute Giuffre’s sexual abuse history and Maxwell’s role in it.205
Thus, the court determined that Maxwell’s implied allegation that Giuffre
lied was actionable under a totality of the circumstances test that included
specific language, verifiability, and literary and social context.206
3. Actionable Fact in Zervos v. Trump
In Zervos v. Trump,207 the New York Supreme Court ruled that Donald
Trump’s assertion that a sexual assault accuser lied was actionable for
defamation.208 After being “fired” as a contestant on The Apprentice,
Summer Zervos continued seeking employment opportunities with
Trump.209 Zervos alleged that during a meeting at Trump’s New York office,
he kissed her twice and that, at another meeting at the Beverly Hills Hotel,
he engaged in unwanted sexual contact with her.210
Zervos decided to come forward about her experiences after Trump
became the Republican Party presidential nominee, so that the public could
fully evaluate him as a candidate.211 The next day, Trump released a
statement denying he met Zervos “at a hotel or greeted her
inappropriately.”212 Additionally, during a campaign rally, Trump claimed
that the “allegations are 100% false,” that “[t]hey are made up, they never
happened,” that “[t]hese claims defy reason, truth, logic, common sense,”
and that “[t]hey’re made without supporting witnesses.”213 Finally, Trump
tweeted that nothing “ever happened with any of these women. Totally made
up nonsense to steal the election.”214

203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 153.
206. Id. at 152.
207. 74 N.Y.S.3d 442 (Sup. Ct. 2018), aff’d, 94 N.Y.S.3d 75 (App. Div. 2019).
208. Id. at 449.
209. Id. at 444.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 445.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. For a complete account of Trump’s numerous public statements at rallies, debates,
and on Twitter calling his accusers, including Zervos, liars, see id. at 445–46.
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Zervos filed suit three days before Trump was sworn in as president of the
United States.215 She alleged that Trump’s claims, that she lied and had
political motives, were defamatory.216 Trump then moved for dismissal or
for a continuance until he left office based on presidential immunity.217
After rejecting Trump’s presidential immunity argument,218 the court
employed the totality of the circumstances test articulated in Davis v.
Boeheim and concluded that Trump’s statements were actionable.219 Trump
used “specific, easily understood language” to convey that Zervos lied to
serve personal interests,220 and his statements were capable of being proved
true or false since they concerned whether Zervos’s goal was to advance her
own interests.221
The court put particular emphasis on the third factor—context. It
reasoned: first, Trump was the only person aside from Zervos who knew
what their interaction was like; second, Trump called Zervos a liar as a matter
of fact, using language such as “phony stories,” “totally false,” and “fiction”;
and third, a reasonable audience could understand Trump’s assertions as fact,
considering that he “knows exactly what transpired.”222 The court also stated
that the fact that Trump made these assertions on the campaign trail223 did
not render them protected rhetorical hyperbole.224
The court therefore found that Trump’s assertions that Zervos was a liar
were actionable for defamation under a totality of the circumstances test that
considered specific language, verifiability, and literary and social context.225
The New York Appellate Division later affirmed this decision.226

215. Id. at 446.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 446–48. The Zervos court determined that Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997)
did not preclude this defamation claim, since “[n]o one is above the law” and no authority
supports the dismissal or stay of a civil action “related purely to unofficial conduct because
defendant is the President of the United States.” Zervos, 74 N.Y.S.3d at 448.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 449 (quoting Davis v. Boeheim, 22 N.E.3d 999, 1006 (N.Y. 2014)).
221. Id. On appeal, the court further explained that the denial of an accusation is not
automatically actionable for defamation, but once uttered in conjunction with a claim that the
accuser is lying, the denial becomes actionable as a “specific factual statement about another
that is reasonably susceptible of defamatory meaning.” Zervos v. Trump, 94 N.Y.S.3d 75, 88
(App. Div. 2019). The appellate court also clarified that, though the use of the word “liar”
could be categorized as nonactionable rhetorical hyperbole, it is not rhetorical hyperbole
where the defendant uses it as part of a denial of factual allegations against him. Id. at 88–89.
222. Zervos, 74 N.Y.S.3d at 449.
223. The fact-opinion distinction is often used to shield political expression, including
outrageous political speech, from defamation liability. SACK, supra note 92, § 4:3.1[B].
224. Zervos, 74 N.Y.S.3d at 449. But see Clifford v. Trump, 339 F. Supp. 3d 915, 925
(C.D. Cal. 2018) (finding that Trump’s “liar” assertions were protected rhetorical hyperbole
in part because he was responding to accusations from a person who “publicly styl[ed] herself
as an adversary to the President” by filing a defamation suit against him).
225. Davis v. Boeheim, 22 N.E.3d 999, 1005 (N.Y. 2014).
226. See generally Zervos, 94 N.Y.S.3d 75 (App. Div. 2019).
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4. Actionable Fact in Dickinson v. Cosby
In Dickinson v. Cosby,227 the California Court of Appeal determined that
statements made by attorney Martin Singer, on behalf of his client Bill
Cosby, were actionable.228 Janice Dickinson alleged that Cosby drugged and
raped her in 1982, and though she did not disclose this in her 2002
autobiography, she did so in a 2014 television interview after other women
had publicly accused Cosby of drugging and raping them.229 An
uncorroborated media story reported that Dickinson had wanted to include
her alleged rape in her autobiography but that Cosby and his attorneys had
pressured her publisher, HarperCollins, out of it.230 Cosby, through Singer,
distributed a demand letter to media outlets and issued a press release, calling
Dickinson a liar in each.231
Dickinson filed suit against Cosby, claiming in part that he defamed her
by “publicly brand[ing] her a liar,” and Cosby responded by filing a motion
under the California “anti-SLAPP statute” designed to limit predatory
litigation that stifles free speech.232 Because the court determined that Cosby
met his initial burden under the anti-SLAPP statute, the burden shifted to
Dickinson to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on her claim.233 Cosby
argued that Dickinson could not prevail on her defamation claim regarding
either the demand letter or the press release because both constituted
nonactionable opinions.234
a. The Demand Letter
Singer’s demand letter called Dickinson’s rape allegation a “defamatory
fabrication.”235 The letter attributed to Dickinson the story that Cosby and
his lawyers pressured HarperCollins into removing details of the alleged rape
from her autobiography.236 It called this “yet another fabrication . . . just like
the alleged rape that never happened.”237 Several times, the letter
encouraged the media outlets to confirm with HarperCollins that Dickinson

227. 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 430 (Ct. App. 2017).
228. Id. at 458.
229. Id. at 438–39.
230. Id. at 439.
231. Id. at 439–41.
232. Id. at 441. Anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) statutes
have been enacted across the country in response to predatory litigation initiated to stifle a
litigation defendant’s free speech rights. Andrew Roth, Comment, Upping the Ante:
Rethinking Anti-SLAPP Laws in the Age of the Internet, 2016 BYU L. REV. 741, 741–45. AntiSLAPP motions provide a mechanism to “weed[] out, at an early stage, meritless claims
arising from protected activity.” Dickinson, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 442.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 439.
237. Id.

716

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

was lying, as Cosby’s legal team allegedly never had any contact with the
publisher.238
The California court used a different version of the totality of the
circumstances fact-opinion analysis than the New York court used in Davis
v. Boeheim. First, the court examined the language itself to determine
whether the statement disclosed the underlying facts without implying the
existence of other undisclosed facts justifying the opinion.239 Second, the
court considered the context of the statement: to whom the statement was
directed, the forum in which the statement was made, the statement’s author,
and whether the statement constituted “predictable opinion” (statements
made in an adversarial setting).240
The court determined that the demand letter implied the “provably false
assertion of fact . . . that Cosby did not rape Dickinson, and she is lying when
she says that he did.”241 Singer’s characterizations of Dickinson’s
allegations as “false and outlandish claims,” “outrageous and defamatory
lie[s],” and a “defamatory fabrication” implied fact rather than opinion.242
Further, the demand letter did not communicate nonactionable opinion just
because it disclosed facts regarding Dickinson’s autobiography and claimed
HarperCollins could confirm that the rape story and assertions that Cosby
pressured it not to print the story were lies.243 First, even if the letter
disclosed these facts, it did not disclose all facts on which the opinion was
based; second, Dickinson’s evidence was that one of these purported facts
was itself false; and third, the language of the letter stated an additional fact
that “the alleged rape never happened.”244
In turning to the context portion of the fact-opinion analysis, the court
relied heavily on Singer’s role as Cosby’s attorney to support its
determination that, at the very least, Singer’s letter was capable of being
interpreted as a factual, absolute denial.245 The court emphasized that this
was more than an anonymous internet posting; “this was a lawyer’s letter
threatening litigation and setting out the factual and legal basis for it.”246
Further, Singer was speaking for Cosby, “who, in turn, would certainly know
whether or not he sexually assaulted Dickinson.”247

238. Id. at 439–40.
239. Id. at 457.
240. Id. at 458. Statements found to be “predictable opinions” are those made in an
adversarial setting, where an audience would expect the speaker to use “fiery rhetoric or
hyperbole” and which would signal that a statement which may otherwise seem like one of
fact is actually opinion. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 459.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 460.
246. Id.
247. Id.

2019]

MILKOVICH, #METOO, AND LIARS

717

b. The Press Release
The court determined that the press release, like the demand letter,
contained statements of fact rendering it actionable. The press release
communicated that “Janice Dickinson’s story accusing Bill Cosby of rape is
a lie” and reiterated the claim that HarperCollins could confirm that Cosby’s
legal team never tried to discourage it from publishing the rape allegation.248
Singer used unconditional language and repeated the same facts relied on in
the demand letter.249
The press release contained the same problems as the demand letter:
Singer failed to disclose other facts on which he relied, falsely stated that
HarperCollins could confirm his story, and expressly stated that Dickinson’s
allegations were lies.250 The court further relied on context. In part because
of the press release’s title, “Statement of Martin D. Singer Attorney for Bill
Cosby,” and its dissemination to the public, it would be reasonable for the
average reader to assume that Singer was speaking for Cosby as his
attorney.251
The court therefore concluded that both the demand letter and press release
were actionable as defamation under a totality of the circumstances test that
considered disclosure and context.252
5. Actionable Fact in Green v. Cosby
In Green v. Cosby,253 the court determined that statements made by
attorney Martin Singer, on behalf of his client Bill Cosby, were actionable as
defamation.254 Three different plaintiffs accused Cosby of drugging and
sexually assaulting them in the 1970s and publicly disclosed the alleged
assaults between 2005 and 2014.255 In response, Singer made several public
statements denying the claims and calling the plaintiffs liars.256
The plaintiffs filed defamation claims alleging that Cosby knew each
statement was false, that the statements were widely read, and that these
statements damaged the plaintiffs’ reputations.257 Cosby then filed a motion
to dismiss,258 arguing in part that the statements at issue expressed statements
of opinion and were therefore not actionable.259
248. Id. at 440.
249. Id. at 461.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. See id. at 457–58.
253. This case has since been settled. See Graham Bowley, 7 Women Suing Bill Cosby
Reach Settlement in Defamation Case, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/04/05/arts/television/cosby-defamation-lawsuit-settlement.html
[https://perma.cc/59R4-AMK5].
254. Green v. Cosby, 138 F. Supp. 3d 114, 133, 135, 137 (D. Mass. 2015).
255. Id. at 120–21.
256. Id. at 121–23.
257. Id. at 121.
258. Id. at 118–19.
259. Id. at 131, 135–36.
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a. The Newsweek Statement
In a statement provided to Newsweek, Singer called one of the plaintiff’s
allegations “a 10-year-old, discredited accusation that proved to be nothing
at the time, and is still nothing.”260 Cosby argued this was predictable
opinion, a statement that an audience would understand to be a “one-sided
expression of opinion rather than fact.”261 The court used a totality of the
circumstances test that examined whether the general tenor or use of
figurative or hyperbolic language indicated that the speaker was
communicating opinion and whether the statement was capable of being
proved true or false.262
The court rejected Cosby’s predictable opinion argument in part because
the statement’s general tenor did not “negate[] the impression that [Cosby]
was asserting an objective fact.”263 The court further determined that
Cosby’s specific language had a clear literal meaning, allowing the
reasonable conclusion that it implied the assertion of a defamatory fact.264 In
particular, the literal meaning of the statement, that the allegations had been
proved to be meritless, was not undercut by hyperbolic or figurative
language.265 Finally, the court determined that the statement was capable of
being proved true or false.266 Both Cosby’s implication that an investigation
was conducted and the general “gist” of the statement, that the plaintiff made
up the allegations, were “sufficiently specific ‘to be susceptible to proof or
disproof.’”267
b. The Statement of November 21, 2014
In a statement made on November 21, 2014,268 Singer described the
plaintiff’s sexual assault claims as “unsubstantiated, fantastical stories,”
adding that “it is completely illogical that so many people would have said
nothing . . . if they thought they had been assaulted over a span of so many
years.”269 Cosby argued, among other defenses, that this statement was
nonactionable because it expressed opinion.270 The court applied Florida’s
fact-opinion test, which requires that nonactionable opinions provide the

260. Id. at 121.
261. Id. at 132.
262. Id. at 131–32.
263. Id. at 132. The court also concluded that, in contrast with relevant California case
precedent applying predictable opinion, Cosby’s statement was not made in the context of
pending or completed litigation. Id. at 131–32.
264. Id. at 133.
265. Id. at 133–34.
266. Id. at 133.
267. Id. (quoting James v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 890, 898 (Ct.
App. 1993)).
268. This statement was also litigated in Hill. See infra Part II.B.2.a.
269. Green, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 122.
270. Id. at 136.
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underlying facts on which the opinion is based and that the analysis include
consideration of context.271
Cosby argued that the statement provided sufficient underlying facts
because it described events that allegedly occurred “30, 40, or even 50 years
ago.”272 However, the court rejected this reasoning because the statement in
its entirety could be understood to assert more than that the allegations were
unsubstantiated “but also as implying they were false and entirely without
merit.”273
The court therefore determined that the Newsweek statement was
actionable under a totality of the circumstances fact-opinion analysis that
considered language and verifiability274 and that the statement of November
21, 2014, was actionable under a fact-opinion analysis that considered
disclosure and context.275
B. Nonactionable “Liar” Statements
In each of the following cases, the court determined that the defendant’s
“liar” statements were not actionable. Part II.B.1 examines the fact-opinion
analysis in a non-#MeToo case where the plaintiff accused the defendant of
committing a crime—and the defendant claimed that the plaintiff lied. Parts
II.B.2 and II.B.3 examine fact-opinion analyses in #MeToo defamation
cases.
1. Nonactionable Opinion in Clifford v. Trump
In Clifford v. Trump,276 a court determined that Donald Trump’s “liar”
statements were nonactionable in a case where Stephanie Clifford,
commonly known as Stormy Daniels, brought a defamation suit against
Trump.277 Clifford claimed that she had an affair with Trump in 2006 and
that in 2011 she agreed to discuss the affair with a magazine.278 She further
claimed that a few weeks after agreeing to discuss the affair, a man
approached and threatened her in an attempt to dissuade her from discussing
the affair.279 After Trump was elected president, Clifford had a sketch artist
draw the man who had threatened her and released this sketch to the public
on April 17, 2018.280 The following day, Trump tweeted: “A sketch years

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 131–32.
Id. at 136.
339 F. Supp. 3d 915 (C.D. Cal. 2018).
See id. at 925–26.
Id. at 919.
Id.
Id.
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later about a nonexistent man. A total con job, playing the Fake News Media
for Fools (but they know it)!”281
Clifford then filed a defamation suit against Trump, claiming he “meant to
convey that [she] is a liar” and “that she was falsely accusing the individual
depicted in the sketch of committing a crime, where no crime had been
committed.”282 Trump moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint, claiming
in part that his tweet was nonactionable opinion.283
The court used a verifiability fact-opinion test that required consideration
of whether the statement was provably false and whether the statement
constituted rhetorical hyperbole.284 Clifford satisfied the first prong since
Trump’s tweet could be proved false if the man who allegedly threatened
Clifford existed or if Clifford did not lie about the threats.285 However, the
court found that Clifford failed to satisfy the second prong because Trump’s
tweet constituted “rhetorical hyperbole” and because of the tweet’s
context.286
The court determined that Trump’s tweet constituted “rhetorical
hyperbole” because Trump used an incredulous tone, which suggested that
his statement was not intended to be understood as a literal statement about
Clifford but instead “sought to use language to challenge [her] account.”287
The court cited the Supreme Court’s holding in Milkovich that a statement
with a tone characterized as “exaggerated[] and heavily laden with emotional
rhetoric and moral outrage” made that statement nonactionable rhetorical
hyperbole.288
The court next found contextual support for its conclusion that Trump’s
tweet constituted rhetorical hyperbole. First, Clifford presented herself as a
political adversary to the president, and Trump’s response to such a person
could properly be characterized as political rhetorical hyperbole.289 The
court analogized the facts to those of a case where the defendant, who had
run for office against a public official, included various defamatory
statements about the public official on his website.290 Because the “website’s
tone” and “campaign context” suggested political rhetorical hyperbole, the
defendant’s statements could not properly be found to constitute
defamation.291 Similarly, because Clifford publicly presented herself as a
281. Id.; see also Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 18, 2018, 6:08
AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/986547093610299392 [https://perma.cc/
Q4V5-8RNJ].
282. Clifford, 339 F. Supp. 3d at 919.
283. Id. at 918, 920.
284. Id. at 926. Although the court also includes the actual malice fault standard in its
“Bentley/Milkovich” test, it is omitted from this discussion since it is not part of the factopinion analysis.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 926–27.
289. Id. at 927.
290. Id.
291. Id.
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“political adversary” to Trump, having previously challenged the legitimacy
of his 2016 election, the court determined that Trump’s tweet was rhetorical
hyperbole.292
Second, the court found that context supported a conclusion that Trump’s
tweet constituted rhetorical hyperbole because he made a single statement,
rather than a sustained attack on Clifford.293 The court distinguished the facts
from a case in which a talk show host repeatedly claimed on air that he had
proof that a judge was corrupt.294 In this case, the court determined that the
talk show host’s statements were actionable due to his repeated efforts,
spanning months, to prove that the judge was corrupt.295 Here, because
Trump neither repeated the allegations nor provided support for his views,
the court found the cases sufficiently distinct to conclude that Trump’s tweet
was rhetorical hyperbole, and thus the court found that the tweet was
nonactionable opinion under a verifiability296 fact-opinion test.297
2. Nonactionable Opinion in Hill v. Cosby
In Hill v. Cosby, the Third Circuit concluded that statements made by
Cosby, his attorney Martin Singer, and his wife Camille Cosby were all
nonactionable pure opinion. Renita Hill alleged that Cosby drugged and
sexually assaulted her in the 1980s, beginning when she was sixteen years
old.298 Too intimidated at the time of the abuse to disclose it, Hill later felt
encouraged by numerous other women who publicly came forward about
their sexual abuse by Cosby.299 She then shared her own story with a reporter
in 2014.300 Hill filed a suit in response to three statements, each spoken by
or on behalf of Cosby, claiming that each defamed her.301
The court relied on the language of the Restatement, that a statement is not
defamatory unless it implies the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts,
to analyze the fact-opinion question in each of these statements.302
a. Singer’s Statement
Singer characterized303 Hill’s sexual assault claims as “unsubstantiated,
fantastical stories.”304 He further stated that it is “completely illogical that

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561, 568–74 (Tex. 2002).
See Clifford, 339 F. Supp. 3d at 926.
Id. at 928.
Hill v. Cosby, 665 F. App’x 169, 171 (3d Cir. 2016).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 175.
This statement was also litigated in Green. See supra Part II.A.5.b.
Hill, 665 F. App’x at 172.
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so many people would have said . . . [or] done nothing . . . if they thought
they had been assaulted over a span of so many years.”305
The court concluded that Singer’s statement represented an opinion
supported by sufficient disclosed facts to render it nonactionable.306
Specifically, the statement included details and explanations such as the
alleged abuse having “occurred 30, 40, or even 50 years ago,” the “absurdity”
that a sexual assault victim would remain silent for so many years, and that
“[t]here has never been a shortage of lawyers willing to represent people with
claims against rich, powerful men, so it makes no sense that” these women
never took legal action at the time they were allegedly assaulted.307
According to the court, these details from Singer’s statements were sufficient
to “allow[] the recipient to draw his or her own conclusions ‘on the basis of
an independent evaluation of the facts.’”308 Therefore, the court determined
that Singer’s statements were nonactionable.
b. Bill Cosby’s Statement
The court also found Bill Cosby’s statement nonactionable because it also
disclosed sufficient underlying facts.309 Cosby stated: “I know people are
tired of me not saying anything, but a guy doesn’t have to answer to
innuendos. People should fact-check. People shouldn’t have to go through
that and shouldn’t answer to innuendos.”310
The court determined that Cosby’s labelling of Hill’s sexual assault
allegations as “innuendos” served the purpose of explaining why he refused
to respond to them.311 Further, Cosby “invited the recipient to conduct his
or her own investigation,” which the court determined was dissimilar to
calling Hill a liar.312 Although the court did not find that Cosby disclosed
underlying facts, it found it sufficient that Cosby invited the public to “factcheck” and thus did not find his statement to be actionable.313
c. Camille Cosby’s Statements
Finally, the court determined that Camille Cosby’s statements were
nonactionable. Camille Cosby said, “[t]here appears to be no vetting of my
husband’s accusers before stories are published or aired.”314 Further, she

305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id.
Id. at 173–74.
Id. at 172, 175–76.
Id. at 176.
Id.
Id. at 172.
Id. at 176.
Id.
Id. at 172, 176.
Id. at 173.

2019]

MILKOVICH, #METOO, AND LIARS

723

compared the rape allegations against Cosby to the fabricated rape
allegations at the University of Virginia.315
The court stated that even if the statements concerned Hill, they could not
reasonably be understood to imply undisclosed facts.316 The court further
determined that a reasonable audience would understand that, as Cosby’s
wife, Camille Cosby would defend her husband against any allegations of
wrongdoing without implicating any underlying facts regarding a specific
accusation.317
Thus, under a disclosure fact-opinion analysis,318 the court found that the
three statements made by Singer, Bill Cosby, and Camille Cosby constituted
nonactionable opinions.
3. Nonactionable Opinion in McKee v. Cosby
The court in McKee v. Cosby319 determined that a statement made by
Singer constituted nonactionable opinion.320 In December 2014, after over
twenty other women had come forward with sexual assault allegations
against Cosby, Kathrine McKee revealed her own allegations that Cosby had
raped her in 1974.321 After the New York Daily News published a story about
McKee’s allegations, Singer immediately sent the newspaper a letter
admonishing it for publishing the story.322 The statement asserted that the
Daily News failed to uphold a “credibility threshold” and failed to investigate
“[a]mple . . . readily available” evidence demonstrating McKee’s lack of
reliability and credibility.323 Singer further provided a list of statements
McKee had allegedly made about her relationship with Cosby and her past
occupation as a Las Vegas showgirl.324 Each piece of information in this list
included citations to news articles and other sources.325 McKee alleged that
Singer leaked copies of this letter to the media, the letters were widely
disseminated, and the letter was defamatory.326
After McKee sued Cosby for defamation, Cosby filed a motion to
dismiss.327 The court granted the motion on the grounds that the letter
conveyed Singer’s opinion that McKee was not credible, McKee’s credibility
was incapable of being proved true or false, and that the Daily News failed to
315. Id. See generally Elias v. Rolling Stone LLC, 872 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2017); Sydney
Ember, Rolling Stone to Pay $1.65 Million to Fraternity Over Discredited Rape Story, N.Y.
TIMES (June 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/business/media/rape-uvarolling-stone-frat.html [https://perma.cc/H3J2-WT2D].
316. Hill, 665 F. App’x at 177.
317. Id.
318. See id. at 175.
319. 874 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 675 (2019).
320. Id. at 63–64.
321. Id. at 58.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 59.
327. Id.
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investigate.328 On appeal, Cosby argued that Singer’s letter focused on the
Daily News’s conduct rather than on McKee’s,329 while McKee argued that
a reader could conclude that Singer’s assertions were based on undisclosed
facts.330
The court implemented a fact-opinion analysis that focused on whether the
speaker disclosed the facts on which their opinion relied.331 The court
disagreed with Cosby’s argument that the letter did not adequately concern
McKee and thus did not defame her.332 The court observed that most of the
letter’s contents related to McKee’s relationship with Cosby and her
credibility rather than her “alleged general propensity to lie.”333
However, the court further found that Singer’s letter disclosed sufficient
facts to protect it from actionability.334 The court cited the letter’s “heavy”
inclusion of citations to other sources, indicating “extensive underlying
facts” to support Singer’s contention that McKee lacked credibility.335
According to the court, whether the facts were probative was irrelevant to the
fact-opinion analysis, as long as the facts “[we]re not both false and
defamatory.”336 Finally, the court concluded that “a reasonable reader would
not understand Singer ‘to be suggesting that he was singularly capable of
evaluating’ McKee’s credibility based on undisclosed evidence.”337 Rather,
readers could draw their own conclusions from the sources provided in the
letter.338 Therefore, the court concluded that Singer’s letter was not
actionable for defamation under a disclosure fact-opinion analysis.339
III. A FACT-OPINION ANALYSIS EXPLICITLY INCLUDING THE DEFAMATION
DEFENDANT’S FIRST-PERSON WITNESS ROLE
Until recent #MeToo-era cases, courts have not had much opportunity to
address the fact-opinion analysis in fact patterns similar to Milkovich,340
where the defendant has firsthand knowledge of the crime underlying the
defamation suit. However, the resurgence of the Milkovich fact pattern in the
#MeToo context highlights the need to reexamine how the Court analyzed
the fact-opinion distinction in Milkovich and how that analysis informs the
way the fact-opinion analysis in #MeToo cases should be conducted.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 62.
330. Id. at 63.
331. Id. at 61.
332. Id. at 63.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 63–64 (quoting Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publ’ns, 953 F.2d 724, 730–
31 (1st Cir. 1992)).
338. Id. at 64; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1977)
(explaining that the value of including underlying facts in a statement of opinion is that
audiences can come to their own conclusions based on the information presented).
339. See McKee, 874 F.3d at 61.
340. See supra Part I.C.2.
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This Note proposes that fact-opinion analyses should incorporate the
defamation defendant’s first-person experience with the alleged underlying
crime that they were accused of committing. Because the defendant was
alleged by their accuser to have been present and involved in the commission
of the crime, they are effectively a potential first-person witness to the crime.
When a defendant is a first-person witness, their assertion that the plaintiff
lied is an implicit use of first-person witness testimony and therefore
constitutes reliance on undisclosed underlying facts.341
Part III.A revisits the Milkovich defendant’s experience as a first-person
witness, as well as the analogous #MeToo defendant’s role as a first-person
witness. Part III.B proposes a fact-opinion analysis focusing on the
defendant’s role as first-person witness to the underlying crime and examines
how successfully the cases presented in Part II considered this factor in their
fact-opinion analyses.
A. Reexamining the Role of Disclosure When a Defamation Defendant Is a
First-Person Witness to the Underlying Crime
The fact-opinion analyses utilized by courts in factually similar
circumstances342 to Milkovich demonstrate that courts use different tests343
and apply similar tests differently.344 Additionally, many courts fail to
recognize the portion of Milkovich most relevant to this particular factual
scenario: where the defendant was a first-person witness to the underlying
events at issue, the defendant possesses undisclosed underlying facts. Thus,
an allegation that the plaintiff lied, spoken by a defendant who allegedly has
first-person experience with the incident in question, should be found to be
actionable.
This is the case both in Milkovich and in #MeToo defamation cases. Part
III.A.1 revisits Milkovich to examine how the defendant’s role as a firstperson witness played into the Supreme Court’s fact-opinion analysis. Part
III.A.2 draws a parallel between the Milkovich defendant’s role as a firstperson witness to the events underlying the defamation claim and the
#MeToo defendant’s role as first person witness to the alleged sexual assault
and argues that the #MeToo defendant’s first-person witness role should
likewise affect the fact-opinion analysis.

341. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
342. See supra Part II.
343. Compare Hill v. Cosby, 665 F. App’x 169 (3d Cir. 2016) (relying on disclosure), with
Green v. Cosby, 138 F. Supp. 3d 114 (D. Mass. 2015) (employing a totality of the
circumstances test).
344. Compare Zervos v. Trump, 74 N.Y.S.3d 442 (Sup. Ct. 2018), aff’d, 94 N.Y.S.3d 75
(App. Div. 2019) (using a totality of the circumstances fact-opinion analysis that considered
the allegedly defamatory statement’s specific language, verifiability, and literary and social
context), with Dickinson v. Cosby, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 430 (Ct. App. 2017) (implementing a
totality of the circumstances fact-opinion analysis that considered disclosure and social
context).
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1. The Milkovich Defendant as First-Person Witness and Possessor of
Undisclosed Underlying Facts
In Milkovich, Diadiun’s statement included several indications that his
assertions that Milkovich lied were based on undisclosed underlying facts
that he possessed because of his personal experience. In his column, Diadiun
stated that he was “among the 2,000-plus witnesses of the meet” and that he
“also attended the [athletics association] hearing,” putting him in “a unique
position of being the only non-involved party to observe both the meet itself
and the Milkovich-Scott version presented to the board.”345 Diadiun also
stated that the school’s student body and “anyone who attended the . . .
wrestling meet” learned a lesson from Milkovich about lying to get out of a
“jam.”346 He further stated that “[a]nyone who attended the meet,” including
an “impartial observer, knows in his heart” that Milkovich committed perjury
at the hearing.347 Diadiun’s statement, that one had to be present at these
events to conclude Milkovich lied, implied that there was relevant
information that could only be gleaned by one’s presence at both events. In
other words, Diadiun’s assertion implied the existence of undisclosed facts
underlying his opinion.348
The Supreme Court’s fact-opinion analysis in Milkovich is consistent with
Diadiun’s possession of undisclosed facts due to his experience as a firstperson witness. The court determined that the statement was verifiable
because it could objectively be proved true or false and because it lacked “the
sort of loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language” which would indicate a
statement incapable of being proved true or false.349 Although Diadiun used
language like “knows in his heart,” which could conceivably be found to be
hyperbolic,350 the hyperbole is cut down by the rest of his assertion, that
anyone who attended the wrestling meet and therefore had access to
information observable at the meet would “know[] in his heart” that
Milkovich lied.
The Court further determined that the statement’s general tenor indicated
the statement was verifiable.351 However, in so concluding, it declined to
lend analytical weight to contextual evidence of the column’s caption, “TD
Says,” and the column’s placement in the sports section.352 The Court
acknowledged that the Ohio Supreme Court relied on these details in

345. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 5 n.2 (1990).
346. Id. at 6.
347. Id. at 7.
348. See SMOLLA, supra note 41, § 6:28 (explaining that the Restatement’s rule is that a
statement of opinion is actionable “only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory
facts as the basis for the opinion”).
349. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21.
350. In his dissent, Justice Brennan stated that this was “obvious hyperbole” since Diadiun
would not have “researched what everyone who attended the meet knows in his heart.”
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 32 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
351. Id. at 21 (majority opinion).
352. See generally Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio 1986).
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concluding, in a sister opinion,353 that Diadiun’s statements were not
actionable.354 The Ohio Supreme Court specifically read Diadiun’s column
as presenting his view, “based upon [his] having witnessed the original
altercation and [athletics association] hearing” that Milkovich lied.355
However, it ultimately interpreted Diadiun’s statements to be nonactionable
opinion because, according to the Ohio Supreme Court, “Diadiun [was] not
making an attempt to be impartial.”356
The U.S. Supreme Court’s acknowledgement and ultimate rejection of the
Ohio Supreme Court’s analysis supports the Court’s opposite interpretation
of Diadiun’s reliance on firsthand experience. Rather than constituting
nonactionable opinion, Diadiun’s statement constituted actionable fact
because his presence at the wrestling meet and hearing implicated reliance
on undisclosed underlying facts. The Court’s fact-opinion analysis in
Milkovich therefore supports a reading that Diadiun’s role as firsthand
witness moved the outcome of the fact-opinion analysis in Milkovich’s favor.
2. The #MeToo Defamation Defendant as First-Person Witness and
Possessor of Undisclosed Underlying Facts
The #MeToo defendant’s experience as firsthand witness to the alleged
underlying crime should likewise impact the fact-opinion analysis in
#MeToo defamation cases.
Allegations of sexual assault are unique as an underlying crime to a
defamation claim because the accused assailant has firsthand knowledge of
what happened. Thus, like Diadiun in Milkovich, the defendants in #MeToo
defamation cases are firsthand witnesses to the alleged underlying crime, a
fact which is key to a fact-opinion analysis. When a #MeToo defendant, in
defending himself against sexual assault allegations,357 calls his accuser a
liar, he invokes the existence of undisclosed facts to which he is personally
privy. It is therefore not merely a matter of the defendant’s opinion that the
plaintiff allegedly lied; the defendant necessarily presents such a statement
as one of fact because the defendant himself would know for a fact whether
the plaintiff lied.
#MeToo defamation defendants who are not the alleged assailants, but are
nevertheless close to the alleged assailant, also have access to undisclosed
facts underlying their statements that the accuser lied.358 Because these
defendants possess undisclosed facts as a result of their relationship with the

353. Id.
354. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 8.
355. Id. at 9 n.3.
356. Id.
357. Some #MeToo defendants have attempted to use the fact that they called their accuser
a liar to defend their own reputation as a defense to the defamation claim. See supra Part I.B
(discussing the self-defense privilege).
358. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing Davis in which the defendant, Boeheim, had a close
friendship with the alleged assailant, Fine, and was sued for calling Fine’s accusers liars).
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alleged assailant, their “liar” statements should likewise be found
actionable.359
The analysis does not differ in #MeToo defamation cases involving
statements made by the defendants’ attorney on their behalf. In these cases,
although the attorney made one or more of the statements at issue, the
attorney’s client is the named defendant in the defamation suit.360 Further,
an audience to a statement made by an attorney on their client’s behalf would
likely not understand the attorney to have first-person knowledge of the
sexual assault. Rather, the attorney represents their client’s perspective on
the sexual assault allegation in a role commonly understood to be dutifully
representing their client’s response.361 However, the attorney’s role as their
client’s mouthpiece in this context accomplishes the same end: the attorney
represents the views of their client, the first-person witness to the alleged
sexual assault.362 Therefore, statements made by attorneys on behalf of
clients should be subject to the same analysis and would likely be found
actionable.
B. A Proper Framework for the Fact-Opinion Analysis Where the
Defamation Defendant Is a First-Person Witness to the Underlying Alleged
Crime
In defamation cases predicated on an underlying allegation that the
defendant committed a crime, the fact-opinion analysis should consider the
defendant’s firsthand knowledge of the alleged underlying crime. The firstperson witness consideration also applies to defendants who are close to the
alleged assailant or speak for them as their attorney.
Inclusion of additional analytical components into a fact-opinion analysis,
such as the statement’s language, verifiability, and context, should be limited
to their relevance to the defendant’s role as a first-person witness to the
alleged crime. These other factors should not be used to expand the analysis
beyond consideration of the defendant’s role as a first-person witness.
Finally, when applied to #MeToo defamation cases, this fact-opinion
analysis should yield the conclusion that the defendant’s “liar” statement is
359. But see infra notes 376–77 (discussing why the court in Hill properly found that
Camille Cosby’s “liar” statement was not actionable pursuant to her spousal relationship with
the alleged assailant).
360. In three of the four Cosby suits surrounding a statement made by his attorney, Martin
Singer, Cosby was the only named defendant. See McKee v. Cosby, 874 F.3d 54 (1st Cir.
2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 675 (2019); Hill v. Cosby, 665 F. App’x 169 (3d Cir. 2016);
Green v. Cosby, 138 F. Supp. 3d 114 (D. Mass. 2015). In the fourth suit, Cosby was the only
named defendant until the plaintiff amended her complaint to add Singer as a defendant.
Dickinson v. Cosby, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 430 (Ct. App. 2017). The amended complaint added
allegations that Singer acted at Cosby’s direction in his capacity as Cosby’s agent, lawyer,
and/or employee. Id. at 444. The complaint also alleged that Singer acted with reckless
disregard in issuing his statements without conducting a reasonable investigation, including
failing to interview Cosby as a witness. Id.
361. See supra Part I.B (discussing various Cosby cases where one or more of the alleged
defamatory statements were made by Cosby’s attorney).
362. See supra Part I.B.
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actionable.363 This is because the defendant, in having called the plaintiff a
liar, implied possession of undisclosed facts underlying this claim.
Conversely, where the defendant is not a first-person witness and does not
have direct access to a first-person witness, their “liar” statement should be
found nonactionable.
Part III.B.1 singles out the cases discussed in Part II that incorporate the
defendant’s first-person knowledge into their fact-opinion analyses. Part
III.B.2 explains which cases discussed in Part II failed to include the
defendant’s first-person witness role in their fact-opinion analyses.
1. Application of the First-Person Witness Framework: The #MeToo
Defamation Cases That Considered the First-Person Witness Role in Their
Fact-Opinion Analyses
Out of the eight cases discussed in Part II, three consider the defendant’s
role as a first-person witness, or their closeness to the first-person witness, in
their fact-opinion analyses and conclude that the “liar” statements were
actionable.364 One case also considered a defendant’s closeness to the firstperson witness and correctly determined that the statement was not
actionable.365
The court in Zervos v. Trump366 acknowledged that Trump was “the only
person other than [Zervos] who knows what happened between the two of
them” and that an audience to his statements would be “cognizant that
[Trump] knows exactly what transpired.”367 Thus, although the court’s
analysis included other analytical elements that did not focus on Trump’s role
as a first-person witness, it nevertheless afforded this concept analytical
weight in determining that Trump’s statements were actionable.
In Davis v. Boeheim, the New York Court of Appeals based its conclusion
that the allegedly defamatory statements at issue were actionable partially on
a consideration of the defendant’s firsthand experience.368 In this case,
James Boeheim claimed that Robert Davis and Michael Lang lied about
having been sexually abused by their former basketball coach, Bernie
Fine.369 The court considered that an audience to Boeheim’s statements
could understand him to be in possession of undisclosed facts.370 This was
in part due to Boeheim’s longtime friendship with Fine, which could suggest
that Boeheim had particular knowledge about Fine due to the relationship.371
363. This analysis is limited to the fact-opinion determination. Other parts of the
defamation analysis may still preclude the #MeToo plaintiff from succeeding on her
defamation claim against her alleged assaulter.
364. See supra Parts II.A.1, II.A.3–4.
365. See supra Part II.B.2.c.
366. See supra Part II.A.3.
367. See Zervos v. Trump, 74 N.Y.S.3d 442, 448–49 (Sup. Ct. 2018), aff’d, 94 N.Y.S.3d
75 (App. Div. 2019).
368. See supra Part II.A.1.
369. See Davis v. Boeheim, 22 N.E.3d 999, 1001–02 (N.Y. 2014).
370. See id. at 1007.
371. See id.
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In this case, Boeheim was not the alleged assailant but was a person close to
the alleged assailant,372 and the court properly relied on Boeheim’s
friendship with Fine in concluding that Boeheim’s remarks were actionable
because Boeheim had access to the first-person witness to the underlying
alleged crime.
In Dickinson v. Cosby,373 the court largely based its conclusion that the
statements at issue were actionable on other analytical elements but
acknowledged attorney Martin Singer’s position as a mouthpiece for Cosby,
who “would certainly know whether or not he sexually assaulted
Dickinson.”374
The court in Hill v. Cosby considered Camille Cosby’s close relationship
with her husband in determining that her statement was nonactionable
opinion. This Note argues that when a defendant is close to the alleged
assailant,375 the court should conclude that the statement is actionable
because the defendant likely possesses undisclosed facts pursuant to the
relationship. However, the court correctly concluded that Camille Cosby’s
statement was not actionable because a spousal relationship is unique. As
the court stated, a reasonable audience would understand that Camille Cosby
would defend her husband without implicating underlying facts relating to
the sexual assault allegations.376 Additionally, no reasonable audience would
understand a spouse to be acting as a mouthpiece as they would understand
an attorney to be communicating for their client in a legal matter.377 The Hill
court therefore properly considered Camille Cosby’s spousal relationship
with Bill Cosby in determining that her statement was not actionable.
The Davis, Dickinson, and Zervos courts relied in part on the defendant’s
possession of first-person knowledge in rejecting the existence of an opinion
protection.378 However, some of these courts were not as explicit about the
importance of the first-person knowledge as they could have been. While the
Davis and Dickinson courts identified and, to varying degrees, relied on the
defendant’s personal knowledge,379 only the Zervos court expressly
recognized and relied on the importance of Trump’s firsthand knowledge of
the underlying alleged sexual assault.380
Finally, although the Hill court properly considered Camille Cosby’s
unique spousal relationship with Bill Cosby and determined that her
statement was not actionable, it failed to consider Cosby and Singer’s legal

372. See id. at 1001, 1007.
373. See supra Part II.A.5.
374. See Dickinson v. Cosby, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 430, 460 (Ct. App. 2017).
375. Such as James Boeheim, who had a close relationship with Bernie Fine in Davis. See
supra Part II.A.1.
376. See Hill v. Cosby, 665 F. App’x 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2016).
377. See supra Part III.A.2.
378. See Dickinson, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 460; Davis v. Boeheim, 22 N.E.3d 999, 1007 (N.Y.
2014); Zervos v. Trump, 74 N.Y.S.3d 442, 449 (Sup. Ct. 2018), aff’d, 94 N.Y.S.3d 75 (App.
Div. 2019).
379. See Dickinson, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 460; Davis, 22 N.E.3d at 1007.
380. See Zervos, 74 N.Y.S.3d at 449.
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relationship and resulting firsthand knowledge of the underlying alleged
sexual assault in analyzing whether their statements were actionable.381
2. Application of the First-Person Witness Framework: The #MeToo
Defamation Cases That Failed to Consider the First-Person Witness Role in
Their Fact-Opinion Analyses
Notably, all of the cases that found the statements at issue to be
nonactionable failed to consider the defendant’s first-person witness role in
conducting a fact-opinion analysis.382
The court in Clifford v. Trump failed to include reference to Trump’s role
as first-person witness to the alleged underlying crime.383 Instead, the court
focused its fact-opinion analysis on verifiability and whether Trump’s
statements were political rhetorical hyperbole.384
In Hill v. Cosby, the court’s fact-opinion analysis focused on disclosure
but to a literal degree.385 Rather than exploring whether Cosby, as firstperson witness to the underlying sexual assault crime, had access to
undisclosed facts, the court determined that Singer and Cosby’s statements
contained sufficient references to other sources of underlying facts to render
them nonactionable.386
Finally, although the court in McKee v. Cosby relied heavily on disclosure
in its fact-opinion analysis, it did not consider whether the defendant, as firstperson witness, had access to undisclosed underlying facts.387 Instead, it
concluded that the statement, written by Cosby’s attorney and containing
numerous citations to publicly available sources, disclosed sufficient
underlying facts to make it nonactionable.388
Two #MeToo defamation cases where the statements at issue were found
to be actionable did not consider the defendant’s role as first-person witness:
Green v. Cosby389 and Giuffre v. Maxwell.390 In Green, the court focused its
analysis on the statements’ general tenor,391 verifiability,392 and specific
language.393 The court failed to lend analytical weight to Cosby’s firstperson experience even though this Cosby case involved a statement spoken
directly by Cosby rather than through his attorney. The court in Giuffre used
381. See Hill, 665 F. App’x at 175–76.
382. See id.; supra Parts II.B.1, II.B.3. But see supra Part III.B.1 (explaining that the Hill
court properly determined that Camille Cosby’s statement was not actionable because of her
spousal relationship with Bill Cosby).
383. See supra Part II.B.1.
384. See Clifford v. Trump, 339 F. Supp. 3d 915, 926 (C.D. Cal. 2018).
385. See supra Part II.B.2.
386. See Hill, 665 F. App’x at 175–76.
387. See supra Part II.B.3.
388. See McKee v. Cosby, 874 F.3d 54, 63 (1st Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 675
(2019).
389. See supra Part II.A.5.
390. See supra Part II.A.2.
391. See Green v. Cosby, 138 F. Supp. 3d 114, 131–32 (D. Mass. 2015).
392. See id. at 133.
393. See id. at 133, 136–37.
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a totality of the circumstances fact-opinion analysis that also failed to
consider Maxwell’s personal knowledge of the alleged underlying events in
concluding that Maxwell’s statement was actionable.394
Overall, courts have largely failed to adequately consider defendants’ firstperson witness role in defamation cases predicated on an underlying
allegation that the defendant, or a person close to them, committed a crime.
Only three courts out of the eight discussed in Part II gave analytical weight
to the defendant’s first-person knowledge,395 whereas the remaining five
failed to raise this factor in their fact-opinion analyses.396
CONCLUSION
The #MeToo movement has brought new light to problems with the
current application of the fact-opinion analysis across the country. The
Supreme Court in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. did not provide
particularly effective closure to the confusion and inconsistency surrounding
the fact-opinion analysis. But Milkovich informs how the analysis can be
properly implemented, at least in cases where the defendant is a first-person
witness to the underlying crime.
Although some of the courts that addressed #MeToo or #MeToo-related
cases acknowledged the defendant’s role as first-person witness to the
alleged sexual assault,397 only the New York Supreme Court, in Zervos v.
Trump, explicitly focused its fact-opinion analysis on this factor.398
However, the law in Milkovich supports such a focus in fact-opinion analyses
and yields the conclusion that #MeToo defendants are not protected by the
fact-opinion distinction.

394. See supra Part II.A.2.
395. See supra Part III.B.1.
396. See supra Part III.B.2.
397. See supra Part III.B.1.
398. Zervos v. Trump, 74 N.Y.S.3d 442, 448–49 (Sup. Ct. 2018), aff’d, 94 N.Y.S.3d 75
(App. Div. 2019).

